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8 April 1966

## GUERRILLA LOGISTICS

U. S. Army Military History Institute

By

~~JUL 13 1966~~

~~U. S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE~~

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Guerrilla Logistics

by

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8 April 1966

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## SUMMARY

Within recent years American military and civilian officials have recognized the increased emphasis the Sino-Soviet Bloc has placed upon guerrilla warfare as an instrument of Communist expansion. The tactics and strategies employed by the Communists have been subjected to intensive study by these officials in the hope of gleaning from history, lessons learned, so that these may be effectively used in developing US doctrine for guerrilla and counterguerrilla warfare. It is the purpose of this thesis to examine the logistical aspects of historical guerrilla operations and to determine whether the United States' doctrine, for logistical support to guerrillas, embraces those elements which were adopted by history's successful guerrilla leaders.

A review of guerrilla operations during the American Revolution, together with guerrilla warfare in Yugoslavia, Greece, Lithuania, China, Malaya, Indo-China, and Cuba indicates that, without exception, guerrillas enjoyed the greatest success when they were supported by the indigenous people within the operational area.

It was the people who provided the guerrillas with food, clothing, shelter, medical assistance and oftentimes, arms and ammunition. The local community was the veritable lifeline for the guerrillas--once this was severed, the guerrilla movement withered and died. A careful study of the operations in Lithuania and Malaya clearly illustrates the absolute necessity of popular support to maintain the movements' viability. In addition, historical evidence readily establishes the importance of resourcefulness, ingenuity, and cunning on the part of the guerrillas, in supporting themselves. The use of the enemy as an unwilling source of supply was of extreme importance in China and Cuba--here too, the ability of the guerrillas to manufacture that which could not be begged, borrowed or stolen often meant success and survival rather than failure and destruction. Finally, this historical review makes quite clear the value of outside, sponsor, assistance in the middle and late stages of guerrilla operations.

The US doctrine, as set forth in Field Manual 31-21, Special Forces Operations, has incorporated many of the logistical concepts employed by successful guerrillas. Adherence to this established US doctrine should insure the logistical success of US or US sponsored guerrilla operations.

In the past the United States has operated from a position of strength in military conflicts--it has been unnecessary to resort to guerrilla warfare--in the future this may not be the case. We have learned the lessons of history well and we must be certain that logistical shortcomings do not cause us to fail should we become guerrillas in the future.

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

For almost two decades American military and civilian minds have been concerned with the catastrophic possibility of thermonuclear war. Today, these same Americans are studying and analyzing, with increasing concern, the opposite extreme of military violence--guerrilla warfare. To many, this form of war seems to have been conceived and developed by the Communists within the twentieth century. This is but one of the many erroneous facts that seem to plague all who study this increasingly popular subject. A brief review of world history quickly dispels the Communist invented theory.

The first war, in which guerrilla forces were used, was fought in China in 360 B.C., when Emperor Huang was engaged in a protracted conflict with Tsai Yao, the leader of the Miao race. It was Emperor Huang who successfully defeated his adversary by using guerrilla forces.<sup>1</sup> The activities of Francis Marion at the Battle of Cowpens in the American Revolution, were governed by the rules which were later invented by Mao Tse-tung. Ernesto 'Che' Guevara, another writer of Communist military doctrine, introduced nothing to the fund of military knowledge that was not practiced in the Peninsular Campaign during the Napoleonic Wars, almost a century before.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Brigadier C. Aubrey Dixon and Otto Heilbrunn, Communist Guerrilla Warfare, p. 20.

<sup>2</sup>Lt Col T. N. Greene, ed., The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him, p. 60.

On 6 January 1961, Nikita Khrushchev announced, among other things, that just wars of liberation would be the chief instrument of Communist expansion. It is difficult to attribute a change in US attitude toward guerrilla warfare to this announced Communist policy--but, shortly thereafter, President John F. Kennedy directed the Department of Defense to take a long hard look at the matter of insurgency and counterinsurgency.

Since that time, professionals and amateurs alike, have written millions upon millions of words on the subject. For the most part, these writers have concerned themselves with the colorful, glamorous tactical phase of guerrilla warfare and the oftentimes key to tactical success--logistics--has been relegated to a casual, footnote treatment. Nonetheless, a carefully conducted review of guerrilla operations will reveal, to even the most biased tactician, that the victories have often been first and foremost logistical and not tactical.

Neglected logistics is not a trait peculiar to present day guerrilla warfare. The matter of beans and bullets support for guerrillas is as old as the word guerrilla or little war which was first introduced into the military vocabulary during the Spanish resistance to Napoleon's invasion. The French tacticians recognized the need for mobility and lean travel in this campaign and, as was their policy, lived off the land or requisitioned their requirements from the local people. This practice of independence from fixed supply point support

is sound. Its employment must be controlled so that the people are not alienated and themselves become guerrillas in order to survive--such was the case in Spain when the people resisted the French invaders during the Peninsular Campaign.<sup>3</sup>

The concept of logistical support for guerrillas in the American Revolution had much in common with the concept which prevailed during the wars in Yugoslavia, Greece, Lithuania, China, Malaya, Indo-China, and more recently in Cuba. It is upon these similarities that the future success or failure of guerrilla operations will depend. How well these lessons are learned, in large measure, will determine whether future generations will have their Tito, Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi Minh, or Castro. It would be indeed tragic if we, in the United States, ignored the logistical doctrine developed over the years simply because we had not examined the historical accounts of guerrilla operations.

Certain basic logistical requirements are necessary to support any military force--whether it is a massive conventional army or a mean, lean guerrilla band. The only real difference is in the volume of support, the source of this support, and the means of getting it to the user. Ernesto "Che" Guevara, one of the foremost tacticians and logisticians of the Cuban Revolution, summarized the logistical requirements of the individual guerrilla, as follows:

. . . weapon and ammunition. . . a hammock, a blanket, personal canned food for reserve, special greases for his rifle, a water flask, general purpose medicines, tobacco, matches and soap.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>Peter Paret and John W. Shy, Guerrillas in the 1960's, p. 8.

<sup>4</sup>"Logistical Support of Guerrilla Warfare" The Review, Vol. XLI, May-June 1962, p. 50.

The modus operandi of the guerrilla dictates a need for extreme mobility and austere and responsive logistical support. Contrary to popular belief, no guerrilla force ever operated successfully over extended periods of time without some degree of outside support--either from a sponsoring government (weapons/ammunition), the enemy (military materiel), the local population (food and shelter), or a combination of these sources. This is the way it has been in the past and there is no available evidence to indicate that such will not prevail in the future.

During this dissertation, the logistical aspects of historical guerrilla operations will be examined with a view toward highlighting the affect of good or poor logistics upon these operations. In addition, the United States' concept of logistical support to guerrilla and counterguerrilla forces will be critically reviewed. Finally, based upon an analysis of the factors involved, specific conclusions will be drawn concerning the validity of currently accepted US concepts.

For almost a quarter century, the author has been intensely interested in the matter of military logistics both as a user and as a provider. In the early days of World War II, as a member of the United States Marine Corps, his role was for the most part that of a user. While not actually operating as a guerrilla, the scarcity of military supplies often made living off the land a matter essential to survival. Upon entering the United States Army in 1948 and

following several years of duty in the jungles of Panama his interest in military logistics dominated all of the other aspects of military service. Intensive training, service, and experience as an airborne adviser, aerial delivery specialist, logistics programmer, airborne division staff officer (G4), and airborne task force logistician (J4), have provided a background of experiences which has significantly assisted the author in making an objective study and analysis of guerrilla and counterguerrilla logistics.

## CHAPTER 2

### LOGISTICAL ASPECTS OF HISTORICAL GUERRILLA OPERATIONS

The popular, learn by experience, philosophy of some American educators cannot be economically applied to either the tactics or the logistics of guerrilla warfare. It would be preferable to modify this philosophy so that we learn from the experience of others and benefit from their successes and failures; capitalize upon the former and avoid the pitfalls that led to the latter. This is a deadly game which can only be won through tactical and logistical resourcefulness, cunning, and ingenuity. History may never repeat itself, but there are some things which do recur, from time to time, in somewhat different form and in a different environment. The matter of logistical support in guerrilla warfare is one of these things.

#### THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1776-1781

During the American Revolution, General George Washington and the Continental Congress rejected a policy that would employ irregular or guerrilla forces against the British as long as other courses of action were open. The passage of time, together with successive defeat at the hands of the British regulars, resulted in a change in this policy.

General Washington's experts in guerrilla operations were Thomas Sumter, Andrew Pickens, and Francis Marion. The latter, popularly

known as the Swamp Fox was a master tactician and logistician whose byword was austerity, whether by design or necessity. His tactics, learned from the Cherokees, were simple and his resources--men and materiel--were meager. With a force of from ten or twenty men he would swoop down upon British columns, disarm them, take their supplies and equipment, leave them in complete confusion and ride off.

Marion's logistical support, more often than not, came from his opponents. The British often abandoned their arms and supplies to escape from this totally uncivilized warrior and his motley band. The Swamp Fox received food and shelter from the sympathetic colonists and his resourceful men forged swords from the saws they took from the sawmills and cast pewter mugs and spoons into badly needed bullets. Francis Marion, like all successful guerrilla leaders, never bit the hand that fed them--he was never cruel or uncharitable to the people upon whom he was dependent for support.<sup>1</sup>

The effect of Marion's activities in the South, during the Revolution, can best be illustrated by a quotation from one of his most formidable enemies, Lord Charles Cornwallis: "The greatest plague in the country, but for Sumter and Marion. . . South Carolina would be at peace."<sup>2</sup>

#### YUGOSLAVIA 1941-1944

Guerrilla warfare started in Yugoslavia on 7 July 1941 in the Serbian village of Bela Crvka. Initially the activities of the

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<sup>1</sup>John Fiske, The American Revolution II, p. 188.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 189.

partisans were very modest because of the lack of weapons and ammunition. These shortcomings were quickly overcome by planned attacks on gendarme stations for the sole purpose of capturing guns and ammunition. As the number of weapons and the amount of ammunition increased, larger forays were mounted, with a resultant greater availability of equipment for the guerrillas and an accelerated rate of growth of the partisan units. In July 1941, it is estimated that the four partisan brigades had a total of 3100 rifles and 5-10 rounds of ammunition per man. By the end of the year, one division-size force had 4000 rifles and automatic weapons-- 150 rounds of ammunition per rifle, 1000 rounds per submachine gun, and 3000 rounds per machine gun; nine such divisions made up the partisan force.<sup>3</sup>

The situation in Serbia, as a result of guerrilla operations, was so serious that on 16 September 1941 Adolph Hitler ordered three German divisions, together with air force units, into the country to initiate large scale military operations against the guerrillas. At that time, most of northwestern Serbia had been liberated and the guerrillas had captured more than 100 motor vehicles. The guerrillas had established a supreme headquarters at Uzice and were supplementing their stocks of weapons and ammunition by producing rifles at a rate of 420 per day and ammunition at a rate of 80,000 rounds per day.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>Vladimir Dedijer, With Tito Through the War, p. 221.

<sup>4</sup>Nikola Kapetanovic, Tito and the Partisans, p. 24.

Josip Broz Tito depended upon the local populace for food and shelter, however, the status of supply was such that the meager quantities available could not be diverted to guerrilla use. Hence, it was often necessary to plan raids for the sole purpose of obtaining food for the guerrillas and some of the more hard-pressed natives.

The density of the German troops and the intensity of their pursuit made the problem of mobility a matter of survival. The guerrillas were highly mobile and in one year, the 2d Serbian Brigade covered 2800 miles on foot. The 1st Serbian Brigade illustrated its foot mobility by walking 75 miles in 36 hours with only one, one-half stop during the period.<sup>5</sup> This was no mean accomplishment when one considers an almost complete absence of vehicles and terrain that was even a challenge for the native goats. In spite of the pursuing Germans and their dependence upon foot-mobility, Tito's guerrillas were able to evacuate over 10,000 of their sick and wounded to Allied hospitals in Italy during the last two years of the war.<sup>6</sup>

The USSR did support Tito with a minimum of arms, ammunition, and some medical supplies. The dependability of this source of supply, however, was such that it had a detrimental affect upon both operations and morale. In late February 1942, in answer to a request from Tito, Russian airplanes were scheduled to deliver ammunition and weapons--these never arrived. Moscow advised Tito to look to the

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<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 32.

<sup>6</sup>James Eliot Cross. Conflict in the Shadows, p. 27.

enemy for weapons and to use those that were available rationally.

The plight of the guerrillas was further illustrated by the text of a message sent to Moscow on 12 June 1943: "Our units fight by day and march by night. They do not sleep and they do not eat. Now we are eating horsemeat without bread."<sup>7</sup>

By the end of 1944, Soviet weapons did arrive in Yugoslavia along with elements of the Red Army. This too was a bitter pill, although helpful, these items had to be paid for by Tito and his guerrillas.

#### GREECE 1942-1944

The Special Operations Executive (SOE) was a wartime agency created by the British to furnish personnel and materiel aid to covert and overt resistance elements in formerly independent nations occupied by German/Italian forces. The SOE was the equivalent of the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Both of these organizations were operational in Greece during 1943 with the goal of keeping Rommel from being supported through Greece and to cause the Axis to assume that the Allies were planning an invasion of Greece instead of Sicily. During the period 1943-44, the SOE and the OSS supported two guerrilla factions in Greece--the EAM/ELAS and the EDES. The former were Communist controlled while the EDES, originally republican in politics, later leaned far to the right. Although these elements did fight the Axis as their common enemy, whenever there was a lull they were apt to fight one another.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup>Nikola Kapetanovic, op. cit., p. 42.

<sup>8</sup>SORO. Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II, by D. M. Condit, p. 4.

In the early days of guerrilla operations in Crete the SOE liaison officers took very little equipment with them into the operational area. In fact, much of what they carried was personal e.g., pistol, flashlight, map, and about \$45 in currency; the aircraft that dropped them into the area carried about a ton of arms and ammunition. The food, clothing and weapons, that were delivered to Crete by naval craft or air-dropped to Greece by parachute and then packed cross-country by donkeys, were literally indispensable to survival. The initial drop to the Greek mainland was made up of thirty-six containers (5 tons) of personal clothing, ponchos, blankets, food, rifles, pistols, ammunition, grenades, and medical supplies. Later, communications equipment became a part of these bundles and together, these became typical air-drop loads furnished the guerrillas on a routine basis. At this point, it should be noted that the clothing shortage in Greece was alleviated to a marked degree by using worn clothing as packing/padding material in the air-dropped bundles--a practice destined to be copied in later years in other parts of the world.<sup>9</sup>

Until such time as the guerrillas could count upon the support from outside the country it was necessary for them to live off the land. The standard of living, especially in the mountain villages, was extremely poor but the people gladly shared what little they had with the guerrillas--for security and to ease the support problem the

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<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 125.

bands were kept small. To further enhance their security and to provide a fresh supply of meat and milk, the guerrillas often travelled as shepherds with their own goats and sheep.<sup>10</sup>

By the summer of 1943, the SOE had armed 8000 EAM/ELAS guerrillas and 4000 - 5000 EDES guerrillas--this distribution was not by design but was rather a geographic accident. On 11 August 1943, to supplement the means of effecting resupply, the EAM/ELAS completed a landing strip 1700 yards long and 200 yards wide to provide landing facilities for C-47 resupply aircraft. This permitted the bringing in of non-droppable supplies and eliminated the possibility of losing air-dropped supplies to enemy forces or having them fall into inaccessible areas.<sup>11</sup>

In addition to the materiel support furnished the Greek guerrillas, the SOE also provided them with gold sovereigns to be used for destitute families, bribery, supplies, and to transport couriers. In 1943, one gold sovereign would buy enough food to feed a family for several weeks; as time passed the existence of the gold brought about rises in prices. The SOE also furnished the guerrilla organizations one gold sovereign per month for each armed guerrilla.

The need to support two guerrilla forces, with divergent political views, posed serious problems for the British. Often, in an effort to control the Communist inspired EAM/ELAS, it was necessary to withhold logistical support from them. This type action was necessary

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<sup>10</sup> Hugh H. Gardner. Guerrilla and Counterguerrilla Warfare in Greece, 1941-1945, p. 37.

<sup>11</sup> D. M. Condit, op. cit., p. 137.

in October 1943; however, it was not too effective since the EAM/ELAS had just captured the entire Italian Pinerolo Division with all of its arms and equipment. In January 1944, when the civil war began to subside, the SOE resumed the logistical support of the EAM/ELAS on a limited basis; EDES was supported completely with clothing, food, heavy weapons, and medical supplies. It should be noted that even when SOE denied EAM/ELAS other support, they never withheld medical supplies. After September 1944, all support to EAM/ELAS was stopped and proved to be instrumental in diminishing the effectiveness of these guerrillas.

#### LITHUANIA 1944-1952

During the period 1944-1952, a small, well led, effective group of guerrillas, the Lithuanian Freedom Army, operated against the Soviet NKVD and completely disrupted Russian plans for collectivization in Lithuania.

The LFA has much to teach us of guerrilla tactics. A small band of highly mobile, supremely trained forces disciplined to silent, effective action, in the years from 1944 to 1952, succeeded in thwarting major Soviet objectives and kept alive in their country the sense of national unity which today distinguishes Lithuania from any other Soviet Republic. And all this done with no illusion of final victory!<sup>12</sup>

The Lithuanian Freedom Army (LFA), like other guerrilla operating on native soil under the heel of a conqueror, was dependent upon

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<sup>12</sup>K. V. Tauras, Guerrilla Warfare on the Amber Coast, p. 4.

the enemy for arms and ammunition and upon the local people for food and shelter. The LFA's arms dated back to the time of the early anti-Nazi resistance; in fact most of their arms and ammunition were of either German or Soviet manufacture. These weapons were for the most part rifles, carbines, pistols, automatic rifles, and machine guns recovered from retreating Nazi soldiers and the Soviet front line units. However, when the shortage of weapons and ammunition became acute, the LFA planned and executed successful raids upon the NKVD arms depots to supplement their dwindling stocks. In addition ambushes were planned for the specific purpose of collecting the weapons and ammunition from the fallen NKVD men.

Initially, the Lithuanian Freedom Army subsisted on voluntary food contributions from sympathetic farmers. Later however, following the forced collectivization of Lithuania's agriculture, this source of food was all but eliminated and it was necessary to supplement their provisions from other stocks. The Soviet warehouses, where the local administration kept grain, meat and fat (collected from the farmers) were ideal targets for the LFA guerrillas. Raids on these warehouses not only aided the LFA food supply, but it also permitted the guerrillas to furnish subsistence items to some of the near-starving families throughout Lithuania. As a bonus, these ration raids also produced arms and ammunition which were taken from the warehouse guards. As the food situation became progressively worse, the LFA directed guerrillas and civilians, alike, to create reserves of grain and fats for longer and longer periods of probable need.

Until 1948, the Lithuanian Freedom Army used their training camps as a home for some of the guerrilla units. Later it was necessary to move out of these concentrated areas into the Lithuanian hinterlands. The new camps were camouflaged to look like clusters of snowdrifts; these were actually tents piled high with snow and made to resemble shelters used by Lithuanian herdsmen. Four to six poles were placed in the ground, with the front higher than the rear, and connected by wooden strips to form a rectangle; the top and sides were covered with spruce branches; the floor was covered with a thick layer of dry spruce cones which also served as a bed. The only things in the shelter were weapons and sleeping men--"although not unbearably cold inside, the faces of the sleepers are covered with frost."<sup>13</sup>

Today the Lithuanian Freedom Army is disbanded, the guerrillas have melted in with the populace to concentrate upon peaceful resistance; the cause--farm collectivization--which completely eliminated their source of food and the sheer weight of Soviet troop reinforcements.

#### CHINA 1927-1949

Mao Tse-tung is the foremost Chinese master of guerrilla warfare. In 1937, after ten years of leadership of the Fourth Red Army (formed from Communists purged from the Kuomintang) Mao formalized his guerrilla doctrine by publishing a pamphlet on the subject. Since its publication this pamphlet and the doctrine outlined within it has

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p. 39.

been studied and accepted by such renowned guerrilla leaders as Ho Chi Minh and Fidel Castro.

It was the ninth of Mao Tse-tung's Ten Military Principles that accelerated his rise to power from 1946 to 1949. ". . . capture from the enemy so as to arm yourself."<sup>14</sup> Mao was a staunch believer in living off the land and off the opposition. In fact, in his doctrine for logistical support of guerrilla forces, he recognized his responsibility for providing only those essential, critical materials necessary to supplement those items which the guerrillas provided for themselves. Mao did his utmost to support his guerrillas, however, the equipment available to these forces depended first and foremost upon their own efforts. To advocate otherwise, he felt, would cause the guerrillas to depend upon higher authority and would result in a marked weakening in their spirit of resistance. To put it another way-- compare a hungry, naked, unarmed guerrilla with one who is well fed, well clothed, and armed to the teeth--the latter individual really has very little to fight for.

From the very beginning of guerrilla warfare on the China mainland, during the struggle with the Japanese in World War II, Mao preached and followed his fundamental philosophy of living off the enemy. The conventional armies of Japan and later those of the Nationalist Chinese provided excellent rear areas in which Mao's guerrillas could operate. Mao solved his logistical problems very quickly; the enemy, Chinese or Japanese, were the principle source of ammunition, weapons,

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<sup>14</sup>Franklin Mark Osanka, ed., Modern Guerrilla Warfare, p. 269.

and equipment. His feelings on the matter are vividly illustrated by the following comment:

We have a claim on the output of the arsenals of London as well as Hanyang, and what is more, it is to be delivered to us by the enemy's own transport corps. This is the sober truth, not a joke.<sup>15</sup>

Although Mao was completely mobile in his operations he did not operate without bases or base areas. Mao felt that--"guerrilla warfare with no bases. . . is nothing but roving banditism; unable to maintain links with the population, it cannot develop and is bound to be defeated."<sup>16</sup> Throughout his guerrilla campaigns he found it necessary to require his units, with the help of the local populace, to establish bases capable of supporting independent operations in the enemy's rear. The establishment of guerrilla operating bases served many needs. They provided a secure place for the storage of logistical reserves and a readily available resupply point which permitted Mao's guerrillas to travel lean and mean.

Mao Tse-tung's men did indeed travel light. Initially, when weapons and ammunition were scarce commodities, his men were armed with spears, swords, knives, shotguns, and locally made mines. Later, as the enemy became careless and his arsenal grew, Mao's weapons became more sophisticated--the lightweight automatic variety were always in greatest demand. The matter of equipment and who got what depended primarily upon the mission of the individual or the unit; possibly of even greater importance was the matter of what was available. Lightly

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<sup>15</sup>Mao Tse-tung. On Guerrilla Warfare, p. 24.

<sup>16</sup>David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare; Theory and Practice, p. 49.

armed ambush groups required very simple equipment while those assigned a mission of destroying a railroad bridge or power station required special demolitions in lieu of rifles and automatic weapons.

As has already been indicated, Mao was really quite specific about his sources of supply. During the war with Japan, communications equipment was primarily of enemy origin and supplemented with items from the regular army; later of course the enemy was the regular army. Another policy expressed very clearly by Mao was his preference for medical supplies of Western origin; when these were not available he would accept items from enemy or local sources. Transport vehicles, when required by the Chinese guerrillas, were also readily obtained from their extremely careless adversaries.

Mao Tse-tung's guerrillas were equipped with distinctive uniforms. This enhanced their pride in their unit and helped to identify them with the cause for which they were fighting. The uniforms were provided through local contributions of money and were manufactured in local tailor-shops or homes of the civilian populace. The guerrillas were forbidden to wear clothing taken from the enemy--this was a cardinal rule and punishment for its violation was severe.

The economic policy, throughout the area of operations, was simple and direct. The local civilians were expected to contribute money, crops, and services according to their means; confiscation was prohibited except in the case of traitors or adamant non-sympathizers.

Mao and his guerrillas depended upon the people; he knew that it would be sheer folly to alienate them and then to lose their support. The Three Rules and Eight Remarks, which governed many of the guerrilla activities, reflect Mao's policy in true oriental fashion:<sup>17</sup>

Rules

1. All actions subject to command.
2. Do not steal from the people.
3. Be neither selfish nor unjust.

Remarks

1. Replace door when leave house.
2. Roll up bedding on which you have slept.
3. Be courteous.
4. Be honest in your transactions.
5. Return what you borrow.
6. Replace what you break.
7. Do not bathe in presence of women.
8. Do not, without authority, search pocketbooks of those you arrest.

MALAYA 1948-1957

In 1941, the Japanese invasion of the Malay Peninsula created a bond of mutual need between the Malay Communist Party (MCP) and the

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<sup>17</sup> Mao Tse-tung, op. cit., p. 92.

British officers who were garrisoned in Malaya. This union, known as the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army, lived in the jungles from 1942 to 1943 suffering great hardships, together with tactical and logistical defeat, at the hands of the Japanese. The meager logistical support which did manage to reach the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) came from parachuted supplies dropped from Allied aircraft flying in from India and Ceylon. In addition the Chinese squatters, who lived on the edges of the jungle, also helped supply the MPAJA guerrillas with food. These squatters were neither Communists nor Communist sympathizers, but they had been badly treated by the Japanese and this was their way of getting even. In 1945, when the Japanese surrendered, the MPAJA emerged from the jungles; great quantities of arms and ammunition were left behind and cached for possible future use.

The time was not long in coming--in 1948 the Malayan Communist Party was ready to operate again. The Communist organization was made up of three semi-independent groups whose operations were closely coordinated by the Party--these were the armed/uniformed military units of the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA); the Min Yuen, a plain-clothes workers group living in the towns and villages; and the Lie Ton Teu, killer squads, who resorted to slashing rubber trees, cutting telephone lines, or were used as strong-arm thugs.

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<sup>18</sup>Anthony Crockett, Green Beret, Red Star, p. 14.

To support the Malayan Races Liberation Army, the Communist Party used the same sources of supply which had been used throughout the history of guerrilla warfare. Arms and ammunition were no problem; initially, all that was necessary was to recover the items which had been cached in the jungles immediately after the surrender of the Japanese. Later, as operations progressed, the MRLA guerrillas obtain replacement weapons and supplemented their stocks through raids upon police posts and by salvaging weapons and ammunition from the victims of their frequent ambushes. Money and food, essential to the furtherance of their cause, were obtained from the Chinese squatters and other civilians through extortion and intimidation. The guerrillas made every village responsible for supplying a quota of money from their weekly pay packets--a kind of oriental kick-back--and each family was obliged to provide food in accordance with quotas placed upon them.

To eliminate this vast, seemingly inexhaustible depot system of logistical support to the guerrillas, the British Briggs Plan was conceived.<sup>19</sup> Under this scheme, a tremendous resettlement operations was undertaken by the civil authorities. The squatters were rounded-up and placed into New Villages which were well planned, compact, and provided with schools, medical care, welfare centers, and experienced a sense of well-being unknown on the edges of the jungles or in the remote guerrilla infested areas. The Briggs Plan was successful, but it was not a cure-all for all of the guerrilla support problems. The

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<sup>19</sup> Brigadier M. C. A. Henniker, Red Shadow Over Malaya, p. 8.

MRLA now had to come into the open in search of food and thus expose themselves to death or capture. Nonetheless, the farmers, in the fields, were still easy prey for the desperate guerrillas; even within the Villages, relatives of members of the MRLA passed food and money to the guerrillas.

In addition to the Briggs Plan, the British used other methods to separate the guerrillas from their supply sources or to intercept supplies enroute to the guerrillas. Roadblocks, checkpoints, and road patrols were used to intercept supplies; local civilians were prohibited from having more food than required for their immediate needs; shopkeepers were made to report on large purchases of food and other items; and at times, food was prepared for an entire village in a community kitchen. These measures were effective, but again, they were not a panacea for the enormous problem of drying up all the sources of supply. A system of searchlights was even installed on the coast to hinder movement of supplies and money from Singapore; this, together with the Royal Malayan Navy patrol craft, was quite effective. Seldom, however, was a guerrilla killed whose weapon and other equipment could not be traced to items lost in an ambush or to some other British or Japanese source.

The British Royal Marine Commandos, along with the Gurkha troops, were among the most successful in combatting the guerrillas in Malaya. The full measure of success enjoyed by the British can most probably be attributed to their ability to overcome hardships never before

encountered in training or in combat. Nonetheless, in spite of their ingenuity and ability to adapt themselves to the situation at hand, the British like other anti-guerrilla forces, were hampered by their immobility when compared to their adversary who was clothed in a light khaki uniform and cap, and equipped with a bandolier of ammunition, a rifle, a grenade, and a first-aid kit.

The British marines did travel light. Was it light enough? On patrol each marine carried rations for three days, a canteen, ammunition pouch, a weapon, and a machete; after the second or third day, the marines sent in an air supply demand stating their logistical requirements and were resupplied by air-drop with food, clothing, ammunition, batteries, oil and cleaning gear for their weapons, medical supplies, soap, cigarettes, and rum.<sup>20</sup> The drop zone was prepared with machetes and saws, since axes made too much noise; sentries stood guard while others worked. Although fairly visible from the air, signals were displayed when the resupply aircraft appeared. After the drop, it was often necessary to cut down more trees to recover fouled parachutes. The practice of using burlap chutes and incendiary grenades or flares was not adopted.

The British rations were very similar to the American "C" ration and the American 5 in 1 ration; the British called theirs twenty-four hour packs or Compo. The former was designed to sustain one man for twenty-four hours, while the Compo was used for sustaining ten men

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<sup>20</sup> Anthony Crockett, op. cit., p. 66.

for one day. Like the American ration, the British ration was bulky, heavy, and more than enough for the specified period i.e., two days rations would last for three days and three days rations would be sufficient for four days. When compared with the low weight, low bulk ration of the Malayan guerrilla (rice, dried fish, and vegetables), the lack of mobility of the anti-guerrilla forces is quite obvious. The guerrilla could carry enough food for many, many days and he neither expected nor received any varied menus--deep in the jungle he cultivated his vegetables and harvested the fish from the streams.

The effect of the British ration load upon the mobility of the Royal Marines was overwhelming and the speed of their patrols was directly related to the load they carried and the distance the patrol could cover before stopping for more supplies. The guerrillas did not have this problem; their ration load was lighter, and their ability to carry any load was greater than that of their British adversary--they could last longer and they often did.

#### INDO-CHINA 1941-1954

The war in Indo-China, which resulted in the establishment of North and South Vietnam, was not truly a guerrilla war. However, the regular forces of Ho Chi Minh did defeat the French and the Vietnamese by employing tactical and logistical concepts which we have come to associate with guerrilla operations. The war in Indo-China, like other revolutionary wars, could neither have been conducted efficiently

nor successfully, by the employment of conventional methods currently identified with our modern, mechanized armies. "It was chiefly with the help of such primitive means, multiplied by a huge number of individuals that the Viet Minh actually succeeded in winning its battles, which were first and foremost logistical victories."<sup>21</sup>

Typical of the many praises heaped upon Ho Chi Minh's General Vo Nguyen Giap was this comment:

Without cement-mixers or bulldozers, without steamrollers and with hastily trained technicians . . . in spite of the systematic bombing of the (French) Air Force, French land and maritime surveillance, the rebellion continues and Chinese equipment arrives in the North; it follows on the heels of the Viet Minh divisions which sometimes penetrate deeply into the lines of the adversary.<sup>22</sup>

The French, from the very beginning, thought the logistical problems of the Viet Minh to be insurmountable. Nothing could have been farther from the truth. Ho Chi Minh was fully aware of the logistical shortcomings of his forces--however, he did something about it.

In the early days of its existence, the Viet Minh logistical system was one characterized by a beg, borrow, and steal policy. During World War II, in addition to receiving weapons and ammunition from air-drops by Allied aircraft, the Viet Minh also stole weapons from the Japanese Army. After the war, the Japanese surrendered their arms, ammunition and other equipment to the Viet Minh--this

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<sup>21</sup>Bernard B. Fall, The Viet Minh Regime, p. 76.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 76.

was the start of Ho Chi Minh's arsenals and supply depots. Early in his campaign against the French, Ho Chi Minh received logistical support from Thailand, Nationalist China, and the Philippines--this assistance was stopped in 1948. Stealing continued however, and no matter who the victims were, the Viet Minh rewarded the bandits with up to three hectares of land for some of the more critical stolen equipment.

As the targets of this thievery became more wary, the Viet Minh began to establish their own primitive production capability. In fact local production became a primary source of arms and equipment. Of necessity these facilities were extremely small, mobile and completely non-mechanized operations consisting of 10-15 people engaged in a single endeavor e.g., the manufacture of crude, though effective, mines. These shops were operating on a direct support basis--mobility was essential so that they could move whenever the force being supported moved. Larger, less mobile facilities, employing up to 500 people were located in firmly held Viet Minh base areas to preclude capture by the French. To illustrate the effectiveness of these manufacturing operations, during the first six months of 1948, the Viet Minh reported that one sector had produced:

". . . 38000 grenades, 30000 rifle cartridges, 8000 LMG cartridges, 60 rounds for bazookas, and 100 mines. Another sector during all of 1948 produced 61 light machine guns, 4 submachine guns, 20 pistols, and 7000 cartridges."<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>23</sup>George K. Tanham. Communist Revolutionary Warfare, p. 68.

In addition to fabrication, Ho Chi Minh's logistical effort also included the repair of unserviceable items and the modification of equipment to adapt it to the needs of the guerrillas.

In 1951, when Mao Tse-tung began to furnish assistance to the Viet Minh, the logistical problems began to subside. Seventy-five percent of the Chinese aid was made up of POL and ammunition--the balance was signal equipment, weapons, and medical supplies. The volume increased steadily: In 1951, 10-20 tons/month; 1952, 250 tons/month; 1953, 400-600 tons/month; beginning of Dien Bien Phu, 1500 tons/month; June 1954, 4000 tons. This increased logistical aid was not without additional problems for the Viet Minh. The Chinese did build a railroad up to the border of Indo-China--here it stopped; again the people were called upon to help the Viet Minh. Such a traffic-jam was inevitable in an underdeveloped country with only one or two railroads and a few poor vehicular roads to serve all of its military and civilian needs.<sup>24</sup>

The coolie porters, thousands upon thousands of them, were truly the mainstay of the Viet Minh transportation system. The Viet Minh organized an Auxiliary Service, which was really a village labor force, to provide transportation service by coolies and whatever other means were available. These included sampans, rafts, pack-horses, carts, bicycles, and 'A' frames--to list but a few. The importance of this Service, to the well-being of the Viet Minh, was such that its use was controlled by the General Staff, General Directorate of Food,

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<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 69.

Interzone Command or other similar agency. While the logistical tasks accomplished by these coolies was fantastic, the inherent problem of caring for themselves detracted a great deal from their efficiency. A great deal of what each coolie carried was required for his own physical maintenance. As a result, the logistical porter overhead for 15 days support of a 12,000 man division force was 50,000 porters; this did not include arms and ammunition resupply.<sup>25</sup>

By 1953, to assist in this large transportation task, the Viet Minh had built up a transport fleet of 1000 trucks. Approximately 315 of these vehicles were organized into a unique transport regiment of nine companies to carry supplies from the border to the main depots. The companies, each organized with 90-100 men and 35 trucks, operated independently with a sector, rather than from a motor pool. The French had forced this concept upon the Viet Minh by destroying the bridges and isolating many of the sectors within the operational area. Each company was self-sufficient; a great deal of double-handling was necessary--but the supply of labor was more than could possibly be exhausted.<sup>26</sup>

The forces of Ho Chi Minh, as was indicated earlier, were revolutionary forces employing the same logistical doctrine which had been proven successful in earlier guerrilla operations. The enemy was used as a principle source of arms, ammunition, and other military supplies; these stocks were further supplemented by support from Red

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<sup>25</sup> Bernard B. Fall, op. cit., p. 77.

<sup>26</sup> George K. Tanham, op. cit., pp. 70-71.

China. While not truly a sponsoring nation, the role played by Communist China was analogous to that of a sponsor in support of a guerrilla force. Food and services (transportation, manufacturing, maintenance) were obtained from the sympathetic populace--again a characteristic typical of an operating guerrilla force.

The Viet Cong, operating in Vietnam today, have learned the lessons, taught them by the experienced Viet Minh, extremely well. An analysis of their modus operandi is completely unnecessary since it would be a repetition of that which occurred in North Vietnam only ten short years ago.

#### CUBA 1953-1959

Ernesto "Che" Guevara's concept of logistical support for guerrilla forces is best exemplified by the following quotations:

. . . the guerrilla's most important source of supply is the enemy himself. So, . . . use the same type of weapons, . . . greatest danger. . . running out of ammunition--an item that must be captured from the enemy.<sup>27</sup>

. . . conduct toward the civilian population, show great respect and demonstrate the guerrillas' moral superiority.<sup>28</sup>

Supply is the greatest problem of the guerrilla. In the early stages of fighting, guerrillas must share the product of the land with the local population, . . . . The local population must be won over through help and sympathy.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>27</sup>Ernesto "Che" Guevara, On Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 10-11.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., pp. 19-20.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., pp. 52-53.

The logistical doctrine contained within the foregoing quotations was religiously studied and practiced by all of the followers of Fidel Castro during the successful campaign against Fulgencio Battista in Cuba.

The success of the guerrillas in Cuba, like many others throughout history, can be attributed primarily to a combination of tactical and logistical ingenuity. Fidel Castro, like so many of his predecessors, made his men travel light and took full advantage of the rugged terrain. Nonetheless, when these guerrillas captured heavy weapons, such as .30 caliber water-cooled machine guns or .50 caliber machine guns, these were used against their former owners and were not wasted. However, the guerrillas had no qualms about abandoning these weapons when the tactical situation required a withdrawal and the heavy weapons were a hinderance to their mobility. This practice, of weapon abandonment, was limited to the heavier weapons; no excuse was accepted for abandoning rifles, light automatic weapons or sub-machine guns.

During ambushes, combat patrol actions and installation destruction missions, the matter of logistics was of primary consideration when determining the tasks to be accomplished. Mines were employed on ambush missions primarily because of the disorganizing effect they had on the enemy. Certainly many enemy soldiers were killed, but more important, those that were only stunned could not shoot; as a result the guerrillas captured a greater amount of ammunition, weapons, and equipment with only a small expenditure of their own resources.

Ammunition supply was one of the guerrilla's greatest problems and every effort was made to conserve it. Weapons were often captured with small quantities of ammunition--but seldom was ammunition captured alone. In other instances, when it was absolutely necessary, the guerrillas would risk annihilation so long as there was a good chance of securing critical items of enemy material. Guerrilla tactics were especially designed to accomplish each mission with a minimum loss of both enemy and guerrilla equipment. If it was tactically necessary to do so, dead guerrillas would be left behind, but their equipment and ammunition would always be recovered by their living comrades. It was the duty of every guerrilla to recover all of this precious materiel. Such was the importance that Fidel Castro and "Che" Guevara placed upon the matter of logistics.<sup>30</sup>

The Cuban people, long since disgusted with the Battista regime, needed no added encouragement to assist, Fidel Castro's guerrillas, their liberators and protectors. The guerrilla bands were kept small so that they could easily be concealed by the local populace, but even more important, so that the force would not be too severe a drain upon the villages which supported them. The essential elements of supply--shoes, medicine, food, blankets, hammocks, waterproof cloth and mosquito netting were used daily by the local inhabitants and were easily furnished to the small guerrilla bands. The guerrillas also depended upon the people for shoe repairs, clothing manufacture,

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p. 16.

baking of bread, medical care, and even for recharging cartridges in the small village workshops. Castro's guerrillas paid for all of the supplies, equipment, and services furnished by the villagers. When money was scarce, a written IOU was used and a promise to return with the payment was left with the villagers. Just treatment of the populace was paramount among Castro's guerrillas for they knew that without their support the guerrillas would surely wither and die. Non-supporters, of course, were quickly treated with appropriate harshness so that they might thoughtfully mend their ways.<sup>31</sup>

The need for operating bases was quickly recognized by Fidel Castro. His guerrillas were required to maintain them, improve them, and to continue to strengthen them throughout the course of the operations. Supply lines moved through a series of houses, terminals, and way-stations throughout the countryside. The supplies stopped moving during daylight and continued during the following night. The importance of maintaining the security of these supply lines was readily appreciated by all concerned--the location of the houses and the terminals was known only by trusted individuals charged with the responsibility for getting the supplies to the bases. Planning of the supply movements was such that the merchandise moved as though it was on a conveyor belt; the scarce items from the cities moved the greatest distance, while the more common items were obtained from nearby sources. The smaller the number of people who knew about the chain, the longer it could be expected to last. At times the supplies were moved by truck convoy and then cached temporarily until it was safe to continue the journey, by pack-mules, over the narrow trails.

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<sup>31</sup>Ibid., p. 53.

The matter of health, sanitation, hospitalization and evacuation was not overlooked by the Cuban guerrilla leaders. Fidel Castro recognized the ignorance of the Cuban people with regard to elementary sanitation, hygiene, and personal cleanliness. Whenever it was feasible, the doctors attached to the guerrilla bands would aid in improving the conditions found in the local villages. This of course was on a very austere basis, since these professionals were by no means in abundance within the guerrilla forces. In the beginning of the guerrilla campaigns, the doctors were fighting too, and all medical care was on a self-help basis. Later, when the guerrillas were in a semi-nomadic state, the doctors did some surgery and preventive medical work. Camps were established for purposes of assisting individuals who were recovering from surgery or disease; on other occasions, private homes were used to care for the convalescing guerrillas. When completely secure bases were established, an evacuation system was inaugurated and permanent hospitals, with extensive facilities, came into being.<sup>32</sup>

The Castro guerrillas often enjoyed the presence of women within their bands. These women were cooks, seamstresses, medical technicians, and oftentimes excellent riflemen. They were said to be indispensable by many of Castro's subordinate leaders.<sup>33</sup> The specific need for

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<sup>32</sup>Ibid., p. 58.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., pp. 57-58.

the steady, comforting hand of a woman has not been mentioned in the other historical accounts of guerrilla logistics, nonetheless, one can be certain that women operated with guerrillas whether they were Latins, Orientals, Greeks, or Slavs.

#### SUMMARY

This review of operations during the American Revolution, together with guerrilla warfare in Europe, Asia, and Cuba has served to identify those characteristics of logistical support to guerrillas which contributed to the success or failure of these operations.

It can be stated categorically that support from the local populace was of the utmost importance to all guerrilla operations. Francis Marion could not have survived had it not been for the food and shelter provided by the sympathetic local people. Ho Chi Minh, Castro, and the guerrillas in Malaya were also completely dependent upon their indigenous benefactors for rations and housing. In Greece, Lithuania, and Yugoslavia, where food was already scarce and being rationed to the local population, the guerrillas made certain that they did not aggravate an already difficult situation--there the sources of food were the enemy depots and air-drops from sponsor nations. The elimination of these latter sources, as illustrated in Lithuania and Greece (ELAS/EAM), was instrumental in causing the failure of the local guerrilla movement.

In addition to providing food and shelter, the local community also served as a primary source for manufacturing/repair services

and transportation resources. Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi Minh, and Castro each developed extensive manufacturing facilities to supplement stocks of arms, ammunition, and demolitions captured from the enemy. On the Asian mainland the work of the thousands of coolie porters contributed in great measure to the uninterrupted transportation of supplies from the source to the user.

The problem of providing the guerrillas with weapons and ammunition was most often solved by making the enemy an unwilling source of supply. This practice was perfected and accepted as basic logistical doctrine by Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi Minh, and Fidel Castro. Oftentimes, as was the case in Malaya and Lithuania, the guerrillas obtained their initial supply of small arms and ammunition from stocks cached during earlier hostilities ie., World War II after the Japanese surrender and during the Nazi resistance.

Finally, this historical review has made clear the importance of assistance from an outside sponsor--following the initial stages of guerrilla operations. The viability of the movements in Greece, Yugoslavia, and Indo-China could not have been maintained without the logistical support from sponsor nations. In the case of the ELAS/EAM in Greece, as indicated earlier, it was the cessation of American and British support to this movement that was responsible for its failure.

## CHAPTER 3

### THE UNITED STATES' CONCEPT OF LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO GUERRILLAS

Before examining the United States' concept of logistical support to guerrillas, it would be well to understand the position of United States special forces in guerrilla warfare operations.

United States special forces have the mission of developing, organizing, equipping, training and directing indigenous forces in the conduct of guerrilla warfare.<sup>1</sup> Unlike the historical guerrilla leaders who had to start from scratch in the development of sources of logistical support, the United States, as a sponsoring nation, does not expect its guerrilla allies to be similarly handicapped.

The United States' concept envisions special forces detachments, from the special forces group, being employed as the leaders, organizers and trainers of the indigenous guerrilla potential uncovered within the area of operations. These detachments are also expected to function as liaison elements between the guerrilla potential and the US sponsor to insure the viability of the guerrilla force through provision of effective and timely logistical support.

The US personnel will be operating at a disadvantage in that, unlike their historical predecessors, they will be non-indigenous to the area of operations. It is for this reason that great stress must be placed upon cunning, ingenuity, imagination and improvisation;

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<sup>1</sup>US Dept of the Army, Field Manual 31-21, p. 17.

these attributes will often yield the greatest rewards and insure continuity of the US leadership.

Although the introduction of non-indigenous personnel into an operational area has obvious disadvantages, the benefits to be derived from their presence far outweigh the shortcomings. The obvious and possibly the most important benefit to be derived from the presence of US representatives, is the availability of a positive, reliable link with a dependable source of logistical support. The guerrillas can thus exert a maximum effort toward tactical operations rather than be concerned with trying to sustain themselves on the resources of an already rationed population. In addition, the guerrillas can benefit from the knowledge of truly professional military instructors and can thus be rapidly welded into an effective operational force rather than continue to function as independent bandit gangs. Finally, the efforts of the guerrilla forces can be coordinated with those of the conventional elements thus materially aiding the over-all tactical effort.

On 3 June 1965, the Department of the Army published Field Manual 31-21, Special Forces Operations, to provide doctrinal guidance to those responsible for the training and operational employment of US Army special forces in unconventional warfare and counter-insurgency operations.<sup>2</sup> This publication covers the matter of tactical doctrine in guerrilla warfare quite extensively and, unlike earlier

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<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 3.

writings on the subject, logistics and its important place in the guerrilla scheme of things is also covered most effectively.

Within a United States theater of operations there is established a special forces operational base (SFOB) designed to direct and support unconventional warfare operations. The SFOB prepares operational special forces detachments, of the special forces group, for deployment into the guerrilla warfare areas and then, after deployment, provides these detachments with operational direction, administration and support in accomplishing the assigned mission. Because of the nature of activities conducted at the SFOB it is normally located in territory firmly under friendly control--special consideration is given to the principles of dispersion and security.<sup>3</sup>

The special forces operational base is organized along functional lines--operational elements and administrative elements. The logistical support furnished the deployed detachments is provided by the logistical support section of the administrative element. This section processes all logistical support requests from the guerrilla warfare operational area (GWOA)--in addition to this paper processing,<sup>4</sup> this section also processes the materiel for shipment to the GWOA.

The United States Army recognizes that the provision of logistical support is one of the primary means for a sponsoring nation to use in assisting any guerrilla movement. The US Army believes that the

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<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 33-34.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., pp. 53-56.

guerrilla should devote most of his time to operational tasks and not be plagued with the need for scrounging for support. Successful guerrilla operations may yield supplies of arms and equipment; however, the sponsoring nation is often the most reliable source of this materiel. The great distances that these supplies must be moved is often a most perplexing problem--particularly when the delivery must be made under clandestine conditions into areas accessible only to sure-footed mountain goats. Fortunately, the logistical requirements of guerrilla forces are normally smaller than those of conventional forces of comparable size and the SFOB, properly assisted, can provide the support.

To insure rapid response to calls for logistical assistance, the supplies and equipment destined for initial and resupply loads are prepackaged for final distribution to the ultimate user. All standard supplies and equipment, to be delivered to the GWOA, are packed in one-man-portable loads weighing 50 pounds. These packages contain, for the most part, balanced kits (weapons/ammunition) and are protected from the hazards of weather, rough handling and deterioration. To minimize the deadweight being delivered, clothing items are often used for internal cushioning material thereby saving weight and bulk.

Another means for insuring responsiveness to needs within the operational area is the use of pre-emergency supply caches. The employment of this technique requires careful, detailed coordination so that the timely placement of these caches is consistent with the

operational requirements and the security of the area in which the cache is to be located. A final consideration, of course, is the adequacy of the packaging material and the length of time the items are to be cached; the longer the period, the greater the probability of the items deteriorating and becoming unserviceable.

Certainly the most positive means for insuring that a guerrilla force is adequately supported with logistics is to have the force carry all their supplies into the GWOA upon initial infiltration. This of course is not the way the lightly equipped, fleet-footed guerrilla wants to operate. The initial loads are austere and consist of those quantities of items essential for survival and combat operations for a specific time period. To reduce the impact of equipment losses which occur during initial deployment, the SFOB often schedules resupply missions on an automatic and emergency basis. The former (automatic) scheduled at a pre-arranged site for delivery shortly after the detachment has entered the operational area and the latter, emergency method, contingent upon call for items at a specific site, by the detachment commander. Emergency items are normally limited to communications equipment and survival items. The frequency of resupply missions is somewhat limited and consideration is always given to the possible compromise of the guerrilla bands. During the initial period, a minimum of one resupply mission is scheduled per month and increased as air superiority is established.

Once in the operational area, logistical support is derived from within the operational area itself--assistance from the SFOB supplements the items available locally. Included in the support obtained from within the GWOA is the involuntary support obtained from the enemy units and their logistical bases. In addition, US controlled guerrilla bands mount specific operations with the sole purpose of replenishing the guerrilla stocks of critical items. The bulk of the support available within the GWOA includes transportation, food, clothing, shelter, care of the sick and wounded, and certain maintenance services.<sup>5</sup> In addition, as a result of combat action, varying quantities of ammunition and arms are recovered from the enemy forces. Finally in those highly developed areas, certain technical items such as radios, surgical instruments, and optical equipment may be available. The sponsor nation normally provides arms, ammunition, demolitions items, communications equipment, and other essentials for combat support--when these are not available locally. Assistance may be expanded to include evacuation of the sick and wounded, provision of food, clothing and other items--again if these are not locally available. The quantities of items required from external sources are normally quite small when compared to the total logistical support required by the guerrilla force. Every effort is made to effect delivery directly to the using unit to minimize the amount of handling

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<sup>5</sup>Ibid., pp. 78-79.

required. When this is not practical, the supplies are dropped to a central location and then redistributed to the using units. This latter method requires a great deal of added time and effort, however, it does give the area commander an opportunity to get a first hand look at his units.

The area commander, in order to realize the greatest benefit from the resources available within the operational area, assigns each guerrilla unit a portion of the area for logistical support. This support is rendered by the auxiliary units within the GWOA--these are clandestine organizations and do not openly express their sympathies or engage in resistance operations. In the first instance, however, each guerrilla unit depends to a marked degree upon its own initiative and aggressiveness to satisfy its logistical needs. The auxiliary units are normally self-sufficient since they are made up of area natives and continue to live in their own homes--within their respective areas, their prime mission is to establish a local, dependable logistical system.<sup>6</sup>

Auxiliary units normally establish a system of support based upon the ability of each family or group to contribute supplies to the guerrilla cause. This levy system has many shortcomings and the area commander must assure himself that the population is not alienated against him as a result of chronic food shortages and competition among guerrillas for these supplies. In addition, oftentimes, the

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<sup>6</sup>Ibid., pp. 78-79.

enemy will resort to a scorched earth policy to deprive the guerrillas of this local assistance. Supplies may also be obtained through a system of bartering or purchasing the needed items. This too may have adverse effects upon the guerrilla force and can result in competition for the levy system--it also may disrupt the local currency situation. The confiscation of required items must be reserved for use against collaborators and then only as a last resort. If left uncontrolled, confiscation will deteriorate to the malpractice of looting.

Internal transportation requirements within the guerrilla operational area are met largely from the locally available resources. The sponsor nation cannot furnish transportation support to the guerrillas for internal operational needs. Foot-mobility will be the primary means of movement--on an as required basis locally procured vehicles and animals may be used to supplement the guerrillas' foot-mobility.

Austerity is the most descriptive word for the characteristics of the medical support within the GWOA. The requirement for medical support among guerrilla units differs from those found in comparable conventional units in two primary ways: first, casualties are fewer in guerrilla units, due to the nature of the tactics, than those in conventional infantry units; second, the incidence of sickness and disease is higher in guerrilla units than it is in comparable conventional units. The medical effort, within the GWOA, is characterized by a self-help policy, first aid stations, hospitals, and convalescent

stations. This support is primarily provided on an area basis, with the basic technicians, doctors, and medical supplies furnished by the guerrilla units themselves--with some minor sponsor nation assistance. In the early stages of the guerrilla operation, the aid stations and hospitals are located together--as activities intensify, these facilities become too large and they must be operated separately. The auxiliary units play an important part in this system by establishing secure convalescent facilities within local houses. These facilities are established and utilized in all stages of guerrilla operations.<sup>7</sup>

Every effort is made to evacuate the wounded and the dead from the combat site. The wounded are often hidden until they can be moved to a unit base--they are cared for and recovered by the local auxiliary unit. Evacuation of the dead is important for security reasons and also to safeguard the relatives of the dead guerrillas. As in the case of the wounded, the dead are also cached away for later recovery, if they cannot be removed from the operational area immediately.

The matter of logistical services within the operational area is one of minor significance. These services are limited to emergency repairs to equipment to keep it operational. The most rigid supply discipline is essential and all guerrillas must be impressed with the necessity for faithfully performing first echelon maintenance. Locally available facilities are to be used to prolong the life of the

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid., pp. 119-122.

equipment with special emphasis placed upon clothing and shoe repairs. The sponsor nation can normally be expected to provide the guerrilla forces with packages of armorer's tools, small arms repair kits, sewing kits, and weapons cleaning materials.

In summary, the United States' concept for logistical support of guerrilla forces is one characterized by a very sophisticated, formally established special forces operational base. From the SFOB, guerrilla units, within the operational area, are supported with arms, ammunition, communications equipment and other critical military supplies unavailable within the GWOA. The United States expects guerrilla forces to live off the land within the operational area and with the support of the local inhabitants provide themselves with food, shelter, transportation, medical assistance and other services. However, the United States is prepared to provide the guerrillas with total logistical support if such becomes necessary. In no instance should the guerrilla operational effort become diluted by the need to search for logistics resources in areas already plagued with supply rationing.

## CHAPTER 4

### THE UNITED STATES' CONCEPT OF LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO COUNTERGUERRILLA FORCES

On 19 February 1963, the Department of the Army published Field Manual 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations, to provide guidance to infantry and airborne commanders and, where applicable, staffs of the brigade, battalion and company when they have the primary mission of conducting counterguerrilla operations. This manual is intended for use by conventional US Army elements and the tactical and logistical doctrine set forth therein has been developed and tailored to meet the requirements of counterguerrilla warfare.<sup>1</sup>

In counterguerrilla operations the brigade trains are still the focal point for logistical operations. The composition of these trains is dependent upon the tactical situation and the disposition of the elements of the brigade. Normally, in counterguerrilla operations, the brigade trains will include--

- (1) Elements of the brigade company headquarters.
- (2) Brigade staff section personnel not normally located at the command post.
- (3) Maintenance and supply section of the aviation platoon.
- (4) Division support command elements, or logistic elements of this command attached to the brigade, if it is organized for administrative self-sufficiency.
- (5) Service elements of combat, combat support, and administrative support units attached to, or in support of the brigade, as necessary.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>US Dept of the Army. Field Manual 31-16, p. 2.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 105-106.

The battalion will normally organize and employ only one trains organization instead of the field and combat trains typical of conventional operations. These trains will not be located in the brigade trains but will normally be in the vicinity of the battalion headquarters or reaction force for security. The battalion trains will include such things as: distributing points for rations, ammunition, and POL; kitchen area; maintenance area; motor pool; medical elements; salvage collecting point; water point; and drop zone or aerial resupply point.<sup>3</sup>

The company trains, that is those elements which provide logistical support to the company, are normally located in the combat base of the parent company.

The currently prescribed logistical systems are adequate to support conventional units engaged in counterguerrilla operations, however, the techniques employed must be tailored and adapted to the environment in which these conventional units must operate. Failure to make the necessary modifications will cause the counterguerrilla force to lose the contest of imagination, ingenuity, and improvisation.

The counterguerrilla force must travel as fast and as far as the guerrilla enemy; to do this it is essential that the force be well supplied, but not over-supplied, to accomplish the mission.

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<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 106.

The force cannot be encumbered with supplies and equipment which are nice-to-have; austerity is the byword. Supplies must be portable; loads are to be configured within a limit of 50 pounds so that each bundle may be carried by one man.

The success of this lightly-loaded counterguerrilla force is dependent upon an uninterrupted, quickly responsive system of resupply. The system emphasizes unit distribution of all supplies and equipment to units as far forward as possible, with aerial resupply as the primary delivery means.

Minimum dependence is placed upon living-off-the-land, unless local procurement is determined to be an effective measure for bolstering the economic status of the operational area. In any case, no matter what the justification for resorting to local sources of supply, the commander of the counterguerrilla force must provide payment to the provider of the logistics support. In many instances, payment in terms of services (digging wells, drains, constructing schools, clearing of land) may be more desirable than money.

The counterguerrilla force must be prepared to provide essential items of supply to the civilians in the operational area, especially the victims of guerrilla attacks, displaced persons, or isolated population centers. A good source of supply for this purpose is captured enemy stocks which are unsuitable for immediate military requirements. No matter what the source of supplies destined for the

support of indigenous personnel, these stocks must be strictly controlled to preclude black marketing and use of these items by the guerrilla enemy.

The difficulty of maintaining a reliable supply system during counterguerrilla operations makes the matter of equipment maintenance one of increased command emphasis. The need for timely preventive maintenance and the necessity for an almost complete reliance upon the small unit's capability to perform maintenance cannot be over emphasized.

The matter of medical support in areas of counterguerrilla operations often requires greater ingenuity and imagination than any other phase of logistical support to the counterguerrilla force. Oftentimes, individuals must rely completely upon self-aid and buddy-aid; the elaborate evacuation system peculiar to a conventional environment cannot be supported in counterguerrilla operations. The extended distances between installations and the independent character of the operations do not lend themselves to the sophisticated system to which the US Army has become accustomed. In those instances where fixed and/or rotary wing aircraft are available and the terrain and operational environment do not preclude their use, air evacuation should be the primary means of transporting casualties. Commanders, at all echelons, must insure that their personnel are aware of the need for self-help and improvisation so that morale will not be completely shattered when the reality of the matter confronts the counterguerrilla force.

In summary, the United States' concept for logistical support to counterguerrilla forces is one which envisions the use of the currently prescribed logistical system tailored and adapted to the unconventional environment in which the force is to operate. The unconventional units must learn to improvise in order to survive; as is the case with the wily guerrilla, the counterguerrilla must tax both his imagination and his ingenuity to survive and win.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS

In analyzing the historical guerrilla operations presented in this dissertation there is an apparent recurrence of logistical support practices which have been instrumental in the success of these operations. In addition, it has been equally obvious that the failure of certain of these guerrilla movements can in large measure be attributed to logistical rather than tactical defeat.

The guerrillas must have certain minimum amounts of food, arms, ammunition, clothing, shelter, and medical assistance--all of which are normally available within the operational area. Further, as was apparent in Indo-China, China, and Cuba, these basic needs may best be obtained from an area in which the civilian population is not merely passively in sympathy with the guerrillas, but there exists a substantial proportion of sympathizers who will give them active and voluntary assistance.

In addition to the support from the community, the activities of Francis Marion, Ho Chi Minh, and Tito highlighted the importance of aggressiveness and ingenuity in obtaining logistics from the operational area. The enemy with his long logistical tail and sophisticated supply system has proven to be an excellent unwilling source of materiel support--Mao Tse-tung, Castro, Ho Chi Minh, and Marion took full advantage of enemy logistics.

The ability of the guerrillas to manufacture items that they could not beg, borrow, or steal, was vividly illustrated in Cuba, Indo-China and China where these efforts significantly supplemented the support obtained from other sources.

Finally, while outside support or a sponsor nation was not absolutely necessary at the start of an insurgency or revolution, as illustrated in Greece, Yugoslavia, and Indo-China, the availability of such assistance affected morale and often precluded the defeat of the movement.

Throughout the history of guerrilla warfare the requirements for logistical support have been truly basic when compared to those requirements generated by a conventional force. The United States Army's concept for logistical support of guerrilla forces recognizes these basic requirements and has provided the special forces group with sufficient means to successfully support their committed detachments within the guerrilla warfare operational area.

The US Special Forces Operational Base concept formalizes the role advocated by the sponsor nation philosophy for supporting guerrilla operations. The quality of the support rendered to the committed detachments cannot help but be outstanding in view of the family relationship between the SFOB (parent) and the committed detachments (children). Inherent in the US concept is a recognition of the need for guerrilla units to be lightly equipped and completely mobile. Further, the practice of existing on an austere basis for extended

periods of time has been made a matter of policy so that the committed detachments will not be demoralized when they are required to live on short rations.

The necessity for guerrillas living off the land and depending upon the local populace for food, shelter, and certain services has also been recognized by the United States Army. This doctrine will stand the guerrillas in good stead when they are required to eat and sleep side by side with their Asian, African, and Latin American allies in furthering a common cause.

The published United States Army's concept for logistical support of guerrilla and counterguerrilla forces is sound. A review of historical accounts of logistical support to guerrilla and counterguerrilla forces has revealed that we have benefited from the mistakes of our predecessors; we have adopted and refined the ways of history's successful guerrilla and counterguerrilla leaders. Nonetheless, we cannot afford to be complacent; our success in the future will be dependent upon the ability of our troops to adapt the doctrine to the environment in which it is to be employed. Training must teach each guerrilla to fight, live, and fight again in the unconventional atmosphere which is becoming more and more conventional with the passage of time.

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